On Oligopolistic Markets for Nonrenewable Natural Resources
Tracy R. Lewis and Richard Schmalensee Considerable effort has been devoted to the theoretical analysis of the effects of supply-side market structure on the pattern of exploitation of nonrenewable resources. Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1975) , Stiglitz (1976) , and Sweeney (1977) have compared competitive and monopolistic exploitation policies, while Salant (1976) , Lewis and Schmalensee (1978, 1979) , and Gilbert (1978) have considered markets in which a cartel faces price-taking buyers and competitive fringe suppliers. But, aside from some remarks by Salant (1976, Appendix B) and some preliminary analysis by Lewis and Schmalensee (1979, Section 4) , no theoretical analysis of oligopolistic market structures:seems to have-been done. This. neglect can hardly be defended by arguing that such structures are of no empirical importance.
The present essay describes some of the central properties of noncooperative equilibria (described more fully below) in oligopolistic markets for nonrenewable natural resources under simplifying assumptions. The stationary model analysed here seems the most natural intertemporal extension of the standard static Cournot model of oligopoly equilibrium: output level choice in the static framework is replaced here by choice of an output path over time. Neither the Cournot model nor the noncooperative model of this paper can be defended as universally descriptive.
But both are tractable representations of oligopoly situations, both have at least a degree of coherence and plausibility, and both may yield useful insights and intuitions. Given the state of static oligopoly theory, we see no defensible, tractable alternative to the Cournot/Nash cooperative approach taken here, but we would -2-not argue that this approach should be taken as the last word. In light of these considerations, it may or may not be reassuring that the general message of our analysis seems to be that natural analogs of many of the properties of the static Cournot model hold in the dynamic situation considered here.
We begin by presenting our assumptions and notation, describing some general properties of equilibria, and establishing the existence of equilibria.
Section II provides some comparative dynamic properties of equilibria in which all sellers have the same costs. We show there, among other things, that increases in the number of sellers or equalization of their reserve holdings (total reserves constant) tends to speed up resource use. Section III deals with the case of unequal costs. Equilibria are characterized in somewhat more detail, and it is shown that the industry equilibrium output path is produced inefficiently. It is demonstrated by example that noncooperative equilibrium may entail the exhaustion of high-cost deposits of a resource before low-cost deposits.
I. Existence and Properties of Equilibrium
In order to see with some clarity how different oligopoly structures interact with the dynamics inherent in natural resource markets, we follow the papers cited above and make the sort of simplifying assumptions common in the literature begun by Hotelling (1931) .2 First, exploration does not occur in the world of this model, and all reserve stocks are known. There exist N "firms", which may be ordinary firms, nations, cartels, or other resource owners, with firm i's reserves at time zero equal to Ii. Let I be the sum of the I i . Second, each firm i can extract its reserves (and transport them to market) at a constant unit cost C i > 0; there are neither depletion effects nor capacity constraints. Let qi(t) be firm i's rate of production at time t, and let Q(t) be the sum of the qi(t). Third, the model is partial equilibrium and stationary; consumers are passive price-takers and their behavior can be summarized by the smooth inverse demand -3-1 function P(t) = P[Q(t)], with P' < 0. There is a single, constant discount rate, r. Following Salant (1976) and others, the inverse demand curve is assumed to satisfy the following: (D.1) P(O) = F, a finite constant greater than the largest of the Ci; (D.2) Demand elasticity, E = -(1/P')(P/Q), is strictly decreasing in Q (or increasing in P); (D.3) There exists a price P such that P{l-[l/NE(P)]}equals the smallest of the C i.
The "choke price", F, may be thought of as determined by the cost and other properties of some sort of backstop, with demand declining smoothly to zero as the price of the resource becomes high enough. If F does not exceed the largest of the Ci, the set of firms must re-defined, since price can never rise above F. Assumption (D.2) is sufficient-but not necessary for industry marginal revenue to be declining in Q whenever it is positive; it is thus a strong convexity assumption. Assumption (D.3) plays much the same role here as Salant's (1976) assumption of a point of unit elasticity; it serves to rule out pathological and technically troublesome behavior of P and E as Q becomes large. It is a bounding assumption and is implied by the plausible assumption that demand is finite at zero price, Finally, the nature of equilibrium must be clarified. We shall be concerned with solutions to a noncooperative game with full information, in which each firm chooses its time-path of output, qi(t), to maximize its net wealth subject to the reserve constraint, taking as fixed the output plans of all other producers, An equilibrium exists when no qi(t) can profitably be changed. The presumption of noncooperative behavior is strong, as is the assumption that firms know each other's output paths in advance. The latter comes close to the assumption of complete futures markets.3 This sort of equilibrium has been explored widely enough in the natural resources context and elsewhere, however, to make our application of it here of some interest, if not to establish its decriptive value.
-4-Under these assumptions, we can partially characterize an equilibrium reasonably simply, relying on the fact that each firm basically faces a relatively simple constrained maximization problem. Let a(P) = -dP/dQ, the absolute value of the slope of the market demand curve. Then at euilibrium there must exist a set of constants, Xi, and functions, qi(t), such that for i = 1,..,N and t > 0,
(c).
where P(t) satisfies the demand constraint.
The second inequality in (lc) is the reserve constraint. The left-hand side of (la) is the discounted net marginal revenue of firm i hen qi(t) is positive and the other firms' outputs are taken as fixed, Demand assumption (D.2)
implies that this is a decreasing function of qi(t), all else constant. It then follows from first principles that unless firm i's discounted net marginal revenue is equal at each instant when it is producing (and non-negative at all such instants) wealth can be increased by redistributing total production over time (or by reducing total production). The constant Xi is then the marginal value, in units of wealth at time zero, of additional reserves. Condition (lb) simply says that if any firm rationally elects not to produce at any instant, discotAed. t rgnal.eyenue at that instant .with q = 0 cahnt exceed discounted net marginal revenue at times when production optimally occurs, The third part of condition (lc) is a standard complementary slackness statement:
reserves will be exhausted unless the marginal value of additional reserves is zero.
Suppose that at some instant m firms are producing, with 1 < m < N. Differ-
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-5-entiation of (la) totally with respect to time and addition across producing firms yields an equation employed frequently in what follows: 4
where C is the average of the Ci for producing firms. The assumption that E rises with P can be seen to imply (3) Qa' < (E+1)/E from which it follows that the denominator on the right of (2) is positive as long as Em > 1. For given P, P is easily seen to be decreasing in C and increasing in m.
Using assumptions that resemble (ii) and (iii) above, Frank and Quandt (1963) establish the existence of equilibrium in a static Cournot oligopoly model. The work of Roberts and Sonnenshein (1976) indicates that assumptions of this sort are almost necessary for existence, in the sense that equilibria apparently exist only by chance or in very special cases if they are violated. Since our model is related to the Cournot model studied by these authors, worries about non-existence of equilbria would seem to have more than usual force here, If our assumption did not suffice to establish existence, one might suspect them of either inconsistency or incompleteness. If equilibria cannot be shown to exist, it is hard to take the study of their properties very seriously.
As it happens, the assumptions made above suffice to ensure existence. Let T be the time at which all production of the resource ceases, Then the Appendix (e) (t) continuous for < t <T and (f) P(t) P for t T...,N, (e) P(t) continuous for 0 < t <T, and (f) P(t) > P for 0 < t < T.
-6-From part (a) of the Proposition, some firms are operating at all times, Adding condition (la) across the operating firms, the numerator on the right of (2) is seen to equal rmXEe r, where D is the average of the Xi of the m operating firms. By (b) of Proposition 1, this means that the numerator on the right of (2) is always positive. This in turn directly implies that mE > 1 at all times, which along with (3) implies.that the denominator on the right of (2) is positive also. Thus P is always strictly increasing. Price starts out at some level not below P and rises continuously and monotonically until it reaches F in finite time, whereupon demand and the resource market vanish forever as the last remaining reserves are exhausted. Total output is positive and decreasing at all time, and it follows from (e) of Proposition 1 that Q(t) declines smoothly to zero as t approaches T.
Let us define market marginal revenue in the usual fashion:
The arguments of the preceding paragraphs, along with (la), (2), and (3), above, then serve to establish Proposition 2 In equilibrium, (a) 0 < P < r(P-C), with strict inequality for finite m, and (b) MR > r(MR-C), with strict inequality for m > 1.
Hotelling ( 
II, Equal Costs
In this Section, we make the simplifying assumption that C i = C for all i.
Proposition 2 implies that (P-C) is always growing at a rate less than r in this -7-case. This, along with conditions (la) and (lb) imply that all firms with positive reserves will produce at time zero; as long as net marginal revenue when q = O,(P-C), grows at a rate less than the rate of interest, so that discounted net marginal revenue declines, it does not pay to postpone the start of production.
On the other hand some firms may exhaust their reserves and cease producing before P reaches F. From these remarks and Proposition 1, it follows that equilibrium in the equal costs case can be characterized by a set of positive, finite exhaustion times {T i .} and shadow values of reserves {X i .} such that for i = 1,...,N,
0
From Proposition 1, P(t) is continuous. It is then immediate that for (Sa)
and (5b) to hold, the qi(t) must also be continuous at all times. If not, some firm's net marginal revenue would change discontinuously at some instant, and this cannot happen in equilibrium. (Such changes imply the desirability of shifting production either before or after the discontinuity until the jump is eliminated.) Each of the q(t) must thus decline smoothly to zero as t approaches Ti.
It follows from (5a) that if firms i and j are producing at any instant and if ki < XA, then qi > q This holds even in the limit as qj + 0, so it must be that Ti > T. But it is then clear that firm i's total production exceeds firm j's, so that I i > I. If firms have unequal reserves, it must be that the firm with the larger reserves has the smaller value of X, produces more at each instant, and exhausts later.6 The first of these suggests that firms with smaller reserves have greater exploration incentives, all else equal,
The preceding paragraph also indicates that if I = I/N for all i, it must be that X i = X for all i. If firms have equal reserves in addition to equal costs, equilibrium is thus unique and is described by (5) with all i subscripts removed. These comparative dynamic results are established in Lewis and Schmalensee (1979, Sect. 4) for the case C = 0, and only trivial modificaitons are required to generalize that proof.8 In the symmetric case, Proposition 3 indicates that increases in N tend to make the market more nearly competitive, as in the standard static Cournot model. Increases in N serve to speed up resource use, in the sense that the total time to exhaustion is reduced and total production is larger at any level of reserves. The latter assertion follows directly form a proof that with I constant, increases in N lower the initial price. Because reserves are drawn down faster with more firms, though, such increases will always make the price higher than it otherwise would have been at some future times. Part (d) of Proposition 3
indicates that more intense rivalry, even though it reduces prices and profits, may enhance exploration incentives. Parts (e) and (f) of that Proposition support the standard intuition that when rivalry intensifies, consumers' gains outweight producers' losses.
We now want to consider the implications of unequal reserves, still assuming cost equality. Let PS(t) and T be the price path and exhaustion time, respectively, in the symmetric case. Consider another market with the same demand curve and the same values of r, C, , and N, but in which I i Ij for some i and j.
Let the price path and exhaustion date in this asymmetric case be P (t) and T a ,
-9-respectively. We now show that P S(0O) < pa (0) and T < T a .
From the discussion above, Ti # Tj in the asymmetric case, so that the number of firms operating decreases over time; an instant before Ta, fewer than N firms are operating, In contrast, all N firms operate until T in the symmetric case. Let T be the time at which the first firm (the one with the smallest 1 of the I) runs out of reserves in the asymmetric case.
Since the motion of price until time T 1 in both cases is given by equation (2) with m = N and C = C, it must be that PS(Ta) > Pa(T). But after T, fewer firms are operating in the asymmetric case, so that equation (2) implies PS(P) > a(P) for all relevant values of P. (Recall that the right-hand side of (2) is increasing in m, all else fixed,) It follows that P(t) > pa(t) for all t > T.
Since a(Ta) = P (Ts) = F and prices are monotone increasing, T s < Ta. But this implies that total production in the asymmetric case exceeds that in the symmetric case and this is impossible. The supposition at the start of the paragraph must therefore be false. Thus PS(0) < pa(O). If the price paths never cross, equality of total produciton will be violated. It follows from the arguments just above that they can only cross after T 1 and that they can only cross once. After the crossing, P S(t) > pa(t), so that T s < Ta, as was to be shown. We There are many measures of concentration in the industrial organization literature, the most appealing of which have the property that they increase as the 10 number of firms falls and as some measure of the inequality of firm sizes rises.
Propositions 3 and 4 taken together indicate that if firm size is defined as total reserves, changes of both these sorts tend to produce higher initial prices and -i0-thus higher prices at any given level of total reserves. These results are thus consistent with the usual notion that increases in concentration worsen market performance, with the problem here being excessive conservation of the resource.
Both these Propositions depend on the equal cost assumption, under which the level of reserves provides a natural, exogenous measure of firm size. The association between concentration and market performance in the static Cournot theory is of a rather different sort. Rader (1972, pp. 270-3) , for instance, shows that the H index of concentration (equal to the sum of squared market shares) relates market demand elasticity to the percentage markup over (an average across the firms of) marginal cost. But in that model, market shares are endogenously determined as a function of marginal costs; H is thus logically endogenous. If all firms have equal costs in the Cournot structure, all will have equal market shr-es, In natural resource markets, even with equal costs, market shares vary over time if reserve holdings are unequal, so that reserve holdings provide the only reasonable basis for judgements about concentration. If costs differ, however, it seems apparent that ny measure of concentration that relates to pricing behavior must reflect both costs and reserve holdings, but it is not yet clear to us how any such measure might be constructed,
IIT, Unequal costs
We now allow both costs and reserve levels to differ among firms. Let us order fims so that C 1 < C 2 < ... < CN, with at least one of the inequalities strict.
We first investigate whether or not firms with different C i produce simultaneously in equilibrium.
If production were efficient, in the sense that the discounted cost of producing the actual total output stream, Q(t), were minimized, this could not occur.
Suppose, for simplicity, that the C i are all different. Then it is reasonably well-known that as long as the rate of interest is positive, efficiency requires exploiting only firm 's reserves until they are exhausted at time T 1 , then ex-
11
.11-ploiting only firms 2's reserves until some later time T2, and so on. It is never efficient to produce from any but the lowest cost currently available reserves; see Solow (1974) for a discussion. To see what drives this, suppose that extraction of a small amount, dq, of I were postponed from t to t 2 , where t < T 1 < t2, with the same amount of 12 extracted at t rather than at t 2 . The change in the present value of cost is then dq{e tl(C2-C1 ) + r 2C1-C2)} = dq{e tl(C2-C1)[-er(t 2 t)]} > O.
Under monopoly, with all reserves in the hands of a single firm, discounted costs are minimized, and reserves with different costs are not simultaneously exploited.
Under competition, with many small firms operating at each cost level, production is also efficient.
But under oligopoly, efficient exploitation is impossible because equilibrium must involve periods during which reserves with different costs are simultaneously exploited. To show this, let us first note that the qi(t) are continuous in any oligopoly equilibrium along with (from Proposition 1) P(t) and Q(t). Given continuity of P(t), continuity of the qi(t) follows directly from conditions (la) and (lb). Now assume the contrary: suppose oligopoly equilibrium output path (t) is produced efficiently. Suppose there are N firms with unit cost equal to C 1 and N 2 with unit cost equal to C 2 . By the assumption of efficiency, there must be a time T 1 such that all firms in the first group cease production at T and all firms in the second group start at that time. By the continuity of the qi(t), however, this must mean that Q(t) approaches zero as t approaches T 1 from eithcr above or below. This means that price falls after T 1 , and that is impossible.
The only way that Q(t) can be kept smooth at T with a shift of all production from firms in the low-cost group to those in the next higher cost group would be for some of the qi(t) to be discontinuous. But, given the continuity of P(t),
III
-12-conditions (1) rule out the discontinuous change in discounted marginal revenue that would result. We have thus established
Proposition 5 If C i P Cj for some i and j, the discounted cost of producing the equilibrium total output stream, Q(t), is not minimized, because firms with different costs are simultaneously producing at some times.
This inefficiency result is the intertemporal analog of the standard finding of inefficiency in asymmetric static Cournot oligopoly; see Schmalensee (1976b) for a simple example. In that context, efficiency requires equating marginal costs of all plants operated at any time, but only in symmetric cases does noncooperative behavior produce this result. These inefficiency results indicate that to think of oligopolistic markets as intermediate between monopoly and competition in all respects is to overlook potentially important qualitative differences.
A number of important properties of equilibria when costs are unequal are given by Propositions 1 and 2. It turns out to be difficult to say much more. In particular, many of the properties of equilibria with equal costs do not generalize.
In order to illustrate the variety of possible outcomes when costs differ, the rest of this section is devoted to establishing and discussing Proposition 6 If Ci > C for some i and j, then in noncooperative equilibrium it is possible that (a) some firms do not begin production at time zero, (b) firm i's output is greater than firm j's at some times and less at others, and (c) production inefficiency is sufficiently severe that firm i's reserves are exhausted before firm I's.
We argue for the first possibility in general terms; the second and third are illustrated by a simple example.
Suppose there is initially only one firm on the market: firm 1 with unit cost C 1 and reserves I 1. Acting as a monopolist, that firm would choose price -13-path Pm(t). Now add a second firm to the market, with cost C 2 between P (0) and F and reserves I2 less than I 1 . Let P (t) be the noncooperative duopoly equilibrium price trajectory, It is clear that by making C2 sufficiently close to F and 12 sufficiently small relative to I1, P (O) can be made to be below C2.
But this means that firm 2 must wait until price has risen (a finite distance) above C2 before it begins production. (Recall that q 2 (t) must then rise continuously from zero; it cannot jump to a positive value.) There is nothing pathological about such behavior, of course. Inefficiency arises only because both firms produce for some time, not because firm 2 waits, At any instant, conditions (la) and (lb) describe a Cournot equilibrium in the qi' based on unit costs equal to (Ci+Xi e ) C. It follows from condition (la) that qi > q if and only if C! < C. When the C i are all equal, the rankings of the C' cannot switch over time, and, as Proposition 4 establishes, the rankings of the qi cannot change either, But if the C i are not equal, it would appear possible for (C -C), and thus (qi-qj), to switch sign once before T for some i and j. To show that appearances are not deceiving in this case and to establish part (c) of Proposition 6, we turn to an example.
Suppose N = 2, 0 < C <:C 2 < F, and demand: is linear with P(Q) 8 F -aQ. With this demand structure, P = (F+2C 1 )/3. Let P = (F-C 1 )/2, and assume C2 < C 1 + P.
Then it is straightforward to show from conditions (1) that if P > P 0 and firm 1
Ifirm 2] is acting as a monopolist, (P-C 2 )[(P-C 1 )] is growing at a rate less than r.
This means that if P < P F and either firm is producing, the other will rationally elect to produce also, f F < 7C 1 , it follows that P < P so that both firms will begin production at time zero because P will always exceed P 0 in equilibrium (from Proposition 1),
At any time when both firms are producing, conditions (la) can be written as
Let s2 = q 2 /Q, the high-cost firm's share of total output, By solving the two equations above for s2, differentiating, and manipulating the result, one obtains
It is clear that s2 = s* is an unstable node of (8a). If s 2 begins above s, s 2 increases and reaches unity in finite time; if s2(0)< s, s 2 declines with time and reaches zero in finite time. Holding C fixed, s is a decreasing function of C 2 ; it is easy to show that C 2 > C 1 implies s < 1/2.
In order to establish part (b) of Proposition 6, it must be shown that equilibria exist in which s 2 (t) takes on values greater than and lss than 1/2. Suppose we have s < I2/I < 1/2. Then if s2(0) s*, firm 2's share of production at each instant will be less than its share of total reserves. Similarly, if s 2 (0)> 1/2, q 2 /Q exceeds I2/I at all times. Thus, in order to meet the reserve constraint, s2(0) must be between s and 1/2, so that s 2 (t) is below 1/2 for a finite time and above 1/2 thereafter, and the proof is complete.
This example illustrates the difficulty, discussed at the end of Section II, of measuring concentration in a sensible way in this sort of market. In the preceding paragraph, firm 2 has higher costs and lower reserves then firm 1, but after a finite period of time its output comes to exceed that of firm 1. Indeed, since s 2 goes to unity, firm 2 is a monopolist for the latter part of the resource market's-existence.
Part (c) of Proposition 6 is established by showing that equilibrium may involve s > s2(0), since then s 2 goes to zero in finite time, and this means that firm 2 exhausts its reserves while firm 1 is still producing at a positive rate, (We noted above that if this happens and if C 1 and C 2 are close enough together,
-15-condition (lb) is satisfied thereafter for firm 2.) Suppose 0 < I2/I < s.
If s2(0) exceeds s, it follows that q 2 /Q always exceeds I2/I. But this is impossible, so that s(0) must be less than s (and greater than I2/I). Firm 2, the high-cost firm, then exhausts first, and the proof of Proposition 6 is complete.
Notice that in this example, as in general, the patterns described by (b) and (c) of that Proposition cannot occur when C 1 = C 2 . Then s = 1/2, (b) is impossible because 2/I cannot be between s and 1/2, and (c) is impossible becuase there is no high-cost firm. The example explored here suggests that these patterns are, at least, more likely when the higher-cost firm has the smaller reserves. Moreover, (b) may be more likely when reserve differences are moderate relative to cost differences, while (c) may require reserve differences that are substantial relative to cost differences, Whether these features of this example hold in general is not known, however. Finally, it is worth noting that while exhaustion of high-cost reserves before low-cost reserves is a particularly vivid manifestation of production inefficiency, we know of nothing that indicates that it signals especially severe waste in any quantitative sense.
-16-Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
It will first be shown that conditions (1) imply (a) -(d) directly.
A fixed-point argument using the Ai is then used to establish the existence of equilibrium, and (e) and (f) are proven in te course of that demonstration.
To prove (a), suppose the contrary. First, suppose that Q(t) jumps to zero at some t'. From (la) and (lb) in the text, this would involve a discontinuous increase in the net marginal revenue of all firms. In the face of such a jump, all firms operating just before t' would have an incentive to delay some production. Thus Q(t) cannot jump to zero in equilibrium.
Second, suppose that Q(t) declines smoothly to zero at some time t' before T. This means that Q(t") is positive for some t" > t'. Thus for at least one firm, conditions (1) imply
But since t" > t' and (P -aqi ) < F, this is clearly not possible. Thus Q(t) cannot jump to zero and cannot decline to zero before T. It follows that Q(t) > 0 for 0 < t < T, as was to be shown, and that Q(t) declines smoothly to zero as t approaches T.
It follows also that equation (2) holds until time T, since m > 1. Adding conditions (la) for operating firms, it is easily seen that the numerator on the right of (2) equals rmEe r t , where X is the average of the i for the operating firms. If X = 0 at any instant, price will be constant forever afterwards, as (lb) makes it clear that no entry will ever occur. But total production must then eventually come to exceed total reserves for all operating firms, so this Let X be a vector of the N Xi, and let A be the set of all X such that < i < (F-Ci). This set is clearly compact and convex. We construct a continuous function y mapping A into itself. By the Brouwer fixed point theorem, this function must have a fixed point, a vector X* such that X* = y(X*). The function y is defined so that any such fixed point corresponds to an equilibrium satisfying conditions (1) .
The first step is to obtain the path P(t) satisfying (la) and (lb) for any
XcA. Let us define
These functions are continuous, but not differentiable when P = C i + X ie t PC(t). Next define the continuous function (P,Xert):
It is apparent that ~ is everywhere continuous, though it is not differentiable when P Pc for any i. Comparing equations (1) If m > 0, (Al) and (A2) imply for all P in a neighborhood of e , and uniqueness still holds. But (3¢/UP) cannot be negative in the limit as P approaches Pi from below, since (A4) indicates that cannot decline to zero as P increases. Since (/aP) increases at P, it cannot be negative in the limit as P approaches Pi from above either, at Pin so that it must be positive in both limits. There is thus one and only one P that solves (P,Xe ) = 0 for any XeA and t > 0. showed above that this could not occur. The continuity of pe is thus established by contradiction. Since e depends on Xe r t , it follows that in equilibrium, P(t) is continuous, establishing part (e) of the Proposition.
We can now define the function y on which the existence proof turns. Pick a vector AsA. For all t > 0, compute P(t) = Pe(Xer ). Then use (la) in the text and (Al) to obtain for all i and t, rt qi(t;X) = Zi[P(t),Xie ]/a[P(t)].
Integration then yields total resource production for each firm implied by and conditions (la) and (lb): in that same set, so by the Brouwer theorem it has at least one fixed point, one vector X*cA such that yi(X*) = X* for i = 1,...,N.
By construction, conditions (la) and (lb) are satisfied by the qi(t;X*).
To prove that fixed points of y are equilibria, it remains only to show that conditions (lc) are satisfied. The first inequalities in (lc) are satisfied by the definition of A. Suppose that D i > O at a fixed point for some i, so that I i exceeds I i and the inequality constraint on total production in (lc) III is violated. Since E i must then be zero for that i by (A5), it follows that ki = F -C But since P can never exceed F, it follows from (A1) that Z i is A A A never positive, thus qi is never positive, I i is zero, and I i cannot exceed Ii.
This contradicts the as, umption D i > 0, so D i must eq'ual zero at a fixed point and the reserve inequality constraints in (lc) are satisfied at fixed points of y. Now suppose that Ei > 0 at a fixed point. As above, this implies that total production falls short of total reserves for firm i with X = 0. This would not violate (lc). But the argument for (b) of the Proposition shows that if X i = 0, firm i's total production as given by (la) and (lb) in the text is infinite. Thus E i cannot be positive at a fixed point. At such points, as at equilibria, E i Di = 0; initial reserves are exactly used up by all firms. The proof of Proposition 1 is complete.
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